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1. Introduction
Social dilemma situations in which the collective interest is at odds with private interests are
widespread. Cooperation among decision makers leads to the Pareto optimum, but free riding
is a dominant strategy and results in a Pareto inferior outcome. In this paper we analyze a
specific social dilemma that involves different benefits from cooperation to different types of
players (benefit heterogeneity) and that introduces leadership (leading by example) either by
appointment (exogenous leadership) or by voting (self-selected or endogenous leadership).
Economists have analyzed social dilemmas in the context of public goods provision. In the
experimental laboratory, the simultaneous linear public goods game (also known as the
voluntary contribution mechanism) has been the main workhorse to study cooperation
empirically (Isaac et al., 1985; Ledyard, 1995; Chaudhuri, 2011). A general finding from 
economic experiments on the public goods game is that decision makers are willing to
cooperate, i.e. willing to contribute voluntarily to the public good, but that cooperation declines
over time unless there is an enforcement mechanism such as punishment.
Leading by example turns the simultaneous linear public goods game (partly) into a
sequential game, without changing incentives or enforcement possibilities. The first-mover can
set an example with her contribution, but has no other means of coercion. Many existing
experimental results indicate that leading by example leads to higher levels of contributions
(Dannenberg, 2015; Güth et al., 2007; Moxnes & van der Heijden, 2003; Pogrebna et al., 2011; 
Rivas & Sutter, 2011). However, there are also several studies reporting weak and non-
significant leadership effect (Gächter & Renner, 2018; Gürerk et al., 2018; Haigner &
Wakolbinger, 2010; Jack & Recalde, 2015; Potters et al., 2007; Sahin et al., 2015).1 Even if not
finding an average increase in cooperation levels, almost all studies show that there is a positive
correlation between leaders’ and followers’ contributions.
Heterogeneity of group members – though common outside the experimental laboratory–
is often not considered explicitly in experiments. The general gist of the existing results is that
heterogeneity tends to lead to less cooperation. If group members have other-regarding or pro-
1 Cartwright et al. (2013) explore the effect of leading by example in a weakest-link game and report a limited effect
of both exogenous and endogenous leading by example in increasing coordination.
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social concerns, they have to coordinate on cooperating, respectively on the level of cooperation; 
heterogeneity makes coordination more difficult. Existing studies finding negative effects of
heterogeneity or null effects have, for instance, looked at heterogeneity in endowments
(Buckley & Croson, 2006; Chan et al., 1999; Charness et al., 2014; Cherry et al., 2005; Ostrom 
et al., 1994; Reuben & Riedl, 2013), heterogeneity in benefits through different returns from
the public good (Fischbacher et al., 2014; Fisher et al., 1994; Kube et al., 2015; Reuben & Riedl, 
2013), heterogeneity in the source of endowment (earned endowment versus allocated
endowment; Oxoby & Spraggon, 2013), and heterogeneity from other observable
characteristics such as religion, ethnic affiliation, nationality, or other identities (e.g., Chen et
al., 2014; Habyarimana et al., 2007).2
The current paper combines benefit heterogeneity and leading by example. In our
laboratory experiment, groups of four members can contribute to a linear public good. Two
group members have a higher return rate from the public goods than the other two, but it is still
a dominant strategy for all group members to contribute nothing to the public good, i.e. to free-
ride. Four treatments allow us to study the effects of leadership by example. We implement two
treatments in which either one randomly selected low-benefit member or one randomly selected
high-benefit member contributes first, and her contribution level is communicated to the other
three members that then contribute simultaneously. A baseline treatment requires all four
members to contribute simultaneously. We introduce a fourth treatment that allows all members
to volunteer for leadership. It changes the exogenous assignment of leadership by example to
2 Several previous experimental studies have explored the effectiveness of punishment in promoting cooperation
with benefit heterogeneity (Kölle, 2015; Nikiforakis et al., 2012; Reuben & Riedl, 2009, 2013). They observe that
punishment is less effective in increasing contributions in heterogeneous groups than in homogeneous groups, and
has no impact on group efficiency in heterogeneous groups. Gangadharan et al. (2017) investigate how the
combination of communication and reward affects cooperation in groups with benefit heterogeneity. They find that,
on top of the reward effect, communication has a positive impact on contributions and group efficiency, but the
effects are smaller than in a homogenous benefit environment. A general explanation for these results is that, when
people obtain different benefits from the public good, there is a normative conflict between contribution equality
and payoff equality. Specifically, high-benefit group members consider equal contributions of all group members as
the social norm, whereas low-benefit group members try to enforce the norm that all group members earn the same.
Different contribution norms among people can thus lead to a negative impact on group efficiency and undermine
the power of otherwise effective mechanisms in promoting cooperation. It is unclear, however, whether leading by
example helps promoting cooperation under normative conflict caused by benefit heterogeneity.
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an endogenous assignment (choice) by self-selected leaders.
We are the first to analyze leadership by example by group members with benefit
heterogeneity using a linear public goods setting. There is a nascent literature in experimental
economics that looks at heterogeneity, more generally, in social dilemmas with leaders. For
instance, heterogeneity in endowments (Levati et al., 2007; Neitzel & Sääksvuori, 2013),
heterogeneity from different identities (Drouvelis & Nosenzo, 2013), heterogeneity in the
length of group membership (Angelova et al., 2019), heterogeneity in religions (Keuschnigg &
Schikora, 2014), and heterogeneity in opportunity costs (Collins, 2016; Dasgupta & Orman, 
2013) have been considered in different studies.3
Levati et al. (2007) find that leading by example works effectively in heterogeneous
endowment populations if all group members rotate in the leader’s role, whereas Neitzel &
Sääksvuori (2013) do not find such a positive effect with a fixed group member being the leader
in repeated interaction. Drouvelis & Nosenzo (2013) show that group members having the same
group identity fosters the effectiveness of leading by example, whereas Keuschnigg & Schikora
(2014) and Angelova et al. (2019) find that leading by example is likely to reduce cooperation
in culturally diverse populations and in communities with group members of different group
membership tenures, respectively. Collins (2016) and Dasgupta & Orman (2013) investigate
heterogeneous opportunity costs of contributing. They report evidence that contributions are
higher when subjects with low opportunity costs contribute first compared to when subjects
with high opportunity costs contribute first.4
Ananyev (2019) concurrently developed a similar setup for leading by example with
heterogeneous benefits. He finds that leading by example does not promote cooperation with
heterogeneous benefits, which is in line with our results. He also implements a voting treatment,
in which voters can determine the benefit level, i.e. the type, of the leader, but not the leader
herself, and most voters prefer the high benefit type to become leader. In contrast, our
3 The experiment in Glöckner et al. (2011) shows that followers respond to leaders more strongly when contributing
is not a dominant strategy for leaders. Similar evidence is provided by Cappelen et al. (2016) and van der Heijden
et al. (2013), who suggest that leaders’ influence on followers is weak when leaders get a high compensation for
leading or have no cost of setting good examples.
4 Notice that our setting of heterogeneous benefits is different from heterogeneous opportunity costs. In our setting,
the marginal costs of contributing are the same for all group members, but the benefits from the group project varies.
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endogenous treatment is based on volunteering for leadership.
Our treatment with self-selected leaders also adds to the literature on endogenous
leadership (e.g., Arbak & Villeval, 2013; Bruttel & Fischbacher, 2013; Cappelen et al., 2016; 
Dannenberg, 2015; Haigner & Wakolbinger, 2010; Préget et al., 2016; Rivas & Sutter, 2011).
In general, there is a tendency that self-selected or endogenous leadership works more
effectively than assigned leadership, but details matter.5
The findings from our experiment suggest a limited effect of leadership by example with
heterogeneous benefits. Our baseline treatment and the two treatments with exogenous
leadership do not differ statistically in terms of contribution levels, irrespective of whether a
high-benefit member or a low-benefit member is the leader. Only when pooling the data of the
two exogenous treatments, we observe a marginally significant increase in contributions
relative to the baseline. However, we do not want to overinterpret this result. This general
finding masks a lot of heterogeneity in contribution paths over time in different groups, with an
indicative result that with high-benefit leaders that contribute a lot initially, group contributions
are effectively raised.
We also find that voluntary leadership, in particular voluntary low-benefit leadership, can
raise contributions significantly. However, voluntary low-benefit leaders are, on average,
strongly exploited by followers, leading to a declining tendency for them to volunteer for
leadership over time. Not surprisingly, groups exhibit extremely low contribution levels when
they have no volunteers for leadership. This weakens the positive effect otherwise brought by
voluntary leadership. Consequently, there is only a slight increase in contributions, on average,
in the endogenous leadership treatment over the baseline level.
Imperfect conditional cooperation by followers, i.e. contributing less than leaders that set
good examples, combined with conflicts about the social norm regarding the “adequate”
contribution level within heterogeneous group, hampers the effectiveness of leading by
example. This is reflected in the conditional cooperation pattern of followers. Followers whose
benefit is different from the leader try to reciprocate according to their perceived contribution
5 Apart from leading by example other implementations of sequential public good provisions have been analyzed
in the experimental laboratory (see, for instance, Gächter et al., 2010; Nosenzo et al., 2011; Potters et al., 2005).
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norm: when led by high-benefit leaders, low-benefit followers reciprocate on a lower level than
high-benefit followers; when led by low-benefit leaders, high-benefit followers reciprocate
similarly as low-benefit followers.
Our results have implications for public goods provision with heterogeneous benefits.
Team work is a relevant example, with a team output that is a public good, and with different
benefits from this public good by different team members. Leading by example seems to be
important in many cases. Take, for instance, an academic project that leads to a paper.
Somebody whose tenure clock is ticking has different benefits from a joint project than
somebody who has just received tenure. On a more global scale, greenhouse gas emission
reduction as a global public good involves both heterogeneous benefits and the necessity of
leading by example. Our results seem to indicate that it requires additional instruments to make
leading by example work under benefit heterogeneity, regardless of leaders are appointed or
volunteer.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the design and
procedures of the experiment. Section 3 presents the main results, and Section 4 provides
concluding remarks.
2. Experimental design and procedures
Our basic game is a four-person linear public goods game that is repeated for ten periods in
fixed groups. In each period, each of the four group members receives an endowment of 20
tokens and is asked to decide about how many tokens to contribute to a group account. The
tokens not contributed remains in one’s private account. Each group member’s contribution to
the group account in period t,  , must satisfy 0 ≤  ≤ 20. The payoff function for an
individual i in period t is
+ × ∑
Among the four group members, two subjects are randomly selected to be of type A (low-
benefit members) and two of type B (high-benefit members).6 The marginal per-capita return
6 We use neutral language in the experimental instructions so as not to bias decisions. For convenience, players of
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from the public account ( ) is set at 0.4 for members of type A and 0.8 for members of type B.
That is, each token a subject keeps in her private account is worth 1 point to her, regardless of
her type; in addition, she earns 0.4 points for each token all group members (including herself)
contribute to the group account if she is of type A, while she earns 0.8 points for each token she
or any other group member contributes to the group account if she is of type B. At the beginning
of the first period, each group member is randomly assigned an ID from 1 to 4. They learn their
own types and ID (that remain the same throughout the experiment). Design details are
described in the experimental instructions, and by reading them aloud at the beginning of the
experiment they are made common knowledge to all participants.
We implement the following four treatments in a between-subject design: (1) Baseline
(BASE): All 4 group members make private contribution decisions simultaneously. (2)
Exogenous high-benefit leader (HBL): One high-benefit member is randomly selected in each
period as the leader. The leader contributes first, and the other three members contribute
simultaneously after receiving information about the leader’s contribution. (3) Exogenous low-
benefit leader (LBL): Similar as HBL, except that the leader is randomly chosen from the two
low-benefit members in each period. (4) Endogenous leader (EN): In each period, all members
could choose whether they want to become leader or not. If none of the four members chooses
to become leader in a given period, the four group members contribute simultaneously and
privately in that period, just like in BASE; if there is only one member who chooses to become
leader in a period, this member makes her contribution decision before the other three group
members, just as in HBL or LBL (depending on the type of the volunteer); if there are at least 
two members who are willing to become leader, a random draw determines the actual first
mover in that period. After their choice, those subjects who have volunteered learn whether
they are leader for the given period. For those who have volunteered but are not chosen as
leader, they obviously learn that they are not the only group member to volunteer.
We follow Gächter & Renner (2010) in how beliefs are elicited. Beliefs are elicited in each
round of the game, after subjects have made their contribution decisions. Specifically, in the
type A are referred to as low-benefit members, and players of type B are referred to as high-benefit members in this
paper.
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baseline treatment we ask participants to estimate the average of the other players’ contributions
within their group, for each type separately. In the leadership treatments, we ask the leader
about her estimate of how many tokens the two different-type followers would contribute on
average, and how many tokens the other same-type follower would contribute; each follower 
needs to submit her estimate of the other followers’ average contribution, for each type
separately, after having seen the leader’s contribution. For subjects who are requested to submit
two estimates in a period, one estimate is randomly selected to count for their earning. If the
belief is correct, the subject receives an additional 3 points; if the belief differs by 1(2) points, 
the subject receives 2(1) points; in all other cases the subject receives nothing from the estimates.
At the end of each period, subjects get feedback including each group member’s type,
contribution to the group account, income (excluding earnings from estimates) and identity
within the group in leadership treatments (i.e. whether one is first mover or not). They are also
informed about their own income from the estimates. Every period of play count towards final
earnings.
After the ten periods, all treatments are followed by a monetarily incentivized social value
orientation questionnaire, known as the ring test (Liebrand, 1984; Liebrand & McClintock,
1988). Subjects have to make binary choices in 24 different allocation tasks. In each task, a
subject has to choose among two allocations that allocate money to herself and another
anonymous recipient. All 24 decisions are paid and the pairing is fixed throughout this part. By
adding up the subject’s 24 decisions, we obtain the total sum of money allocated to herself (x-
amount) and to the recipient (y-amount). The subject’s social value orientation is calculated as
the angle of the vector θ that results from the ratio x/y. Based on the ratio x/y, one can assign
each subject to one of eight categories of social orientation (individualism, altruism,
cooperation, competition, martyrdom, masochism, sadomasochism, and aggression). A more
accurate measure of social value orientation is the exact angle θ, positive in the first quadrant
and negative in the fourth quadrant. Almost all subject ratios lie in these two quadrants: thus,
the larger this angle, the more pro-social the subject. We will use this measure in our analysis.7
7 One may wonder whether subjects’ decisions in the social value orientation test are affected by their experience in
the public goods game. However, we believe this should not be a concern for our data analysis. First, the recipient
is randomly chosen from all other subjects in the session and is thus not necessarily on of the former group members
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From the 24 decisions, one can also measure a subject’s consistency in making allocation
choices. When using the data from the social value orientation test, we consider only subjects
with a consistency measure of at least 50%.8 At the end of the experiment, subjects learn their
total income from the main part of the experiment and from the ring test.
The experiment was conducted in the MELESSA laboratory at the University of Munich.
A total of 236 subjects were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). Subjects remained
anonymous throughout the experiment, and cash payments were made privately. The
experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). We
conducted two sessions for each of the treatments BASE, HBL and LBL, and four sessions for
treatment EN, with 24 subjects in each session.9 At the beginning of each session, subjects
received the instructions for the public goods game. The instructions for the ring test were
handed out to subjects after the end of the main part. However, subjects knew that there would
be a second part after the ten periods of the main part and that it would be unrelated to the first
part. Instructions were written in neutral language. In order to test the understanding of the rules
and the incentive structure subjects were asked to answer control questions after reading the
instructions aloud. The experiment did not proceed until all subjects had answered all questions
correctly. Sessions lasted, on average, about 75 minutes, and subjects earned approximately
€ 13.7, on average.
3. Experimental results
We organize the presentation of our results in the following way. Section 3.1 compares average
contributions across the treatments and situations. Section 3.2 studies contribution behavior of
from the public goods game. Second, there is evidence that experiencing a public goods game does not significantly
affect subjects’ social/cooperative preferences (Ackermann et al., 2019; Fischbacher & Gächter, 2010). Third, the 
ratio from the social value orientation test is anyway only an auxiliary variable in our analysis.
8 There is no standard with regard to the threshold for the consistency measure. Note that releasing this restriction
by shifting the threshold downwards (even including all subjects into the analysis, irrespective of their consistency)
does not change any of the results in the results section.
9 There are 20 subjects in the second session of treatment HBL due to an insufficient number of subjects showing
up.
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leaders and followers. And, Section 3.3 explains the heterogeneity in contributions across
groups in the exogenous high-benefit leadership treatment. Unless specified differently, the
non-parametric tests are two-sided Mann-Whitney rank sum tests, with each group as a
statistically strictly independent observation. We do not postulate formal hypotheses, since it is
very difficult to ex ante specify whether a potential positive effect of leading by example
outweighs the potential problems of coordination with heterogeneous benefits or not. Both a
positive or a negative sign of the overall effect of leading by example with heterogeneous
benefits seem plausible. However, given the results from the relevant literature discussed above,
we expect voluntary leadership to work better in raising contributions than imposed leadership.
3.1 Treatment differences
The upper panel of Table 1 and the left panel of Figure 1 give an overview of the average
contributions by treatment over time. 10  Contributions start out at about 50% of the total
endowment in all treatments and decrease over time in varying degrees. A two-sided Kruskal-
Wallis test shows that there is no significant difference between the four treatments in average
contributions over all ten periods (p = .82, N = 59).11 As shown in Figure A1-A4 in the
appendix, there is lots of heterogeneity in contributions across groups, in particular in HBL. We
will discuss potential underlying mechanisms for the large between-group variance in more
detail in Section 3.3.
As the right panel of Figure 1 indicates, there are three possible states of the world in EN:
(1) the actual leader is a high-benefit member (which we will refer to as EN_HBL), (2) the
actual leader is a low-benefit member (EN_LBL), and (3) nobody volunteers, hence the group
has no leader (EN_NL). Using a within-group test by including only those groups that
experienced both states, we find that group contributions are highest with voluntary low-benefit
leaders and lowest when nobody in the group has volunteered to be the leader, as summarized
10  Figure A1-A4 present the evolution of contributions by group for each treatment. Figure A6 looks at the
contributions of the two player types in treatment BASE.
11 This is also true for pair-wise comparisons (p > .35 for any pair-wise test). Only in the pooled exogenous
leadership treatments do we observe a marginally significant increase in average contributions as compared to the
baseline treatment (p = .07, N = 35).
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by Table 2.
Table 1: Average contributions by treatment and by state in EN
Periods 1-10 Periods 1-5 Periods 6-10
BASE 7.2(1.91)
8.89
(1.49)
5.5
(2.7)
HBL 9.17(4.76)
10.01
(4.74)
8.32
(5.08)
LBL 8.21(3.28)
9.0
(2.71)
7.42
(4.45)
EN 8.38(3.16)
9.71
(3.62)
7.04
(3.55)
EN_NL 4.61(3.33)
6.99
(4.43)
3.87
(3.28)
EN_HBL 9.12(3.48)
9.99
(3.67)
7.42
(3.69)
EN_LBL 11.18(3.32)
11.64
(4.10)
9.62
(4.97)
Note: Standard deviations based on group averages in parentheses.
Table 2: Comparisons of contributions in treatment EN
Within-group comparison Contributions # of observations
EN_NL vs. EN_HBL 4.61 vs. 9.24*** N=21
EN_NL vs. EN_LBL 4.83 vs. 11.43*** N=18
EN_LBL vs. EN_HBL 11.18 vs. 9.31** N=21
Note: Two-sided Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests: * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
Figure 1: Average contributions in the treatments (left) and the three states in EN (right)
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Table 3: Random effects regression of group-level contributions
Dependent variable:
Average group contributions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HBL 1.970 1.970 2.072 2.057
(1.482) (1.485) (1.390) (1.399)
LBL 1.012 1.012 1.634 1.565
(1.063) (1.064) (1.303) (1.285)
EN 1.182 1.574* 1.853* -0.213
(0.833) (0.872) (1.088) (1.167)
EXO 1.584* 0.701
(0.873) (1.178)
EXO*Period 0.376**
(0.174)
EN*Period 0.161
(0.179)
EN_NL -2.695*** -1.701*
(0.875) (0.941)
EN_HBL 1.937** 2.297**
(0.890) (0.923)
EN_LBL 3.519*** 3.236***
(0.923) (1.008)
Period -0.534*** -0.534*** -0.746*** -0.463***
(0.072) (0.072) (0.135) (0.066)
Average SVO of own benefit type 3.055** 3.120** 3.120** 2.760*
(1.446) (1.438) (1.439) (1.429)
Average SVO of the other benefit type 2.538 2.604 2.604 2.244
(1.616) (1.634) (1.635) (1.601)
High-benefit type 5.354*** 5.354*** 5.354*** 5.354***
(0.607) (0.607) (0.608) (0.608)
Constant 7.196*** 7.196*** 0.553 0.515 1.680 0.327
(0.535) (0.536) (1.312) (1.310) (1.265) (1.276)
R2 overall 0.02 0.12 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.30
N 590 590 1180 1180 1180 1180
Note: The reference category in the regression is the baseline treatment. The variables “HBL”, “LBL”, “EN”, “EXO”, “EN_NL”,
“EN_HBL” and “EN_LBL” are dummy variables indicating the treatments or states. SVO is the angle of the vector elicited in the
social value orientation task: the larger this value is, the more pro-social the subject is. “Average SVO of own benefit type” is the
average angle of own benefit type; “Average SVO of the other benefit type” is the average angle of the other benefit type; “High-
benefit type” is a dummy variable that is 1 if the type receives high benefits from the public good. Cluster robust standard errors
in parentheses (clustered on group level). * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
Using each group for the periods in which the state is in effect as the unit of observation,
we can also compare contributions in the three states of EN (as shown in the lower panel of
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Table 1), to contributions in BASE. It turns out that average contributions with voluntary
leadership (EN_HBL+EN_LBL) are significantly higher than those in BASE (9.73 vs. 7.20,
p < .05, N = 36).12 However, average contributions in EN_NL are significantly lower than those
in BASE (4.61 vs. 7.20, p < .01, N = 33), which undermines the positive effect brought by
voluntary leadership. Compared to imposed leadership, voluntary leadership is more effective
only when leaders are of the low-benefit type (11.18 in EN_LBL vs. 8.21 in LBL, p < .01, N =
33; 9.12 in EN_HBL vs. 9.17 in HBL, p = .72, N = 35).
Table 3 reports results for a random effect regression of group-level contributions. Model
(1) only includes the four treatment dummies as independent variables, and it confirms the non-
parametric results. In Model (2), we further split the treatment dummy “EN” into three state
dummies. Both the coefficients of “EN_HBL” and “EN_LBL” are positive and significant,
indicating that group contributions with voluntary leaders are significantly higher, regardless
of the leader type. The significantly negative coefficient of “EN_NL” clearly reflects the
drawback in EN: when nobody is willing to take the lead and all group members contribute
simultaneously, group contributions are significantly lower than in BASE and other states of
EN (p < .0001, Wald test). Also, we confirm that voluntary low-benefit leadership is more
effective than voluntary high-benefit leadership (p = .02, Wald test) and imposed low-benefit
leadership (p = .03, Wald test).
Models (3) to (6) add controls for group average cooperation preferences using subjects’
ring test scores. Since excluded subjects (those whose answers are inconsistent in the ring test)
might differ in terms of the benefit type across treatments/states, we compare group-level
contributions, after controlling for the benefit type. The time trend is also included. In Model
(3), where we add these control variables, the coefficient of the treatment dummy “EN”
becomes marginally significant at the 10%-level. There is no significant difference in
contributions between “HBL” and “LBL” (p = .82, Wald test). We thus pool the two exogenous
leadership treatments in Model (4). In line with the non-parametric results, there is a marginal
increase in group contributions in the pooled exogenous leadership treatments as compared to
12 Contributions are significantly higher in EN_LBL than in BASE, and contributions are higher in EN_HBL than
in BASE but the difference is not significant at conventional levels (p < .01 for EN_LBL vs. BASE; p = .12 for
EN_HBL vs. BASE).
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the baseline treatment. Model (5) further shows that the decay in contributions under exogenous
leadership is slower than in the baseline treatment. In Model (6), where we add control variables
on top of Model (2), we still find a positive effect of voluntary leadership and a negative effect
of no voluntary leadership. However, we do not find significant evidence anymore that
voluntary low-benefit leadership is more effective in raising contributions than other leadership
conditions (p = .26 for EN_HBL vs. EN_LBL; p = .2 for LBL vs. EN_LBL, Wald tests).
Result 1: Relative to BASE, contributions are marginally significantly higher only when we
pool the exogenous leadership treatments and in treatment EN. Group contributions decay at a
significantly slower rate in the pooled exogenous leadership treatments than in BASE.
Result 2: Groups with voluntary leaders, in particular voluntary low-benefit leaders,
contribute significantly more than groups in BASE. When nobody is willing to volunteer for
leadership, group contributions are significantly lower in EN than in BASE.
Figure 2: The frequency of the three possible states overall (left) and over time (right)
Figure 2 plots the overall frequency of the three possible states in EN and the frequency
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dynamics over time.13 Overall, leadership is implemented 74% of the time. Broken down, 46%
of the time the group has a voluntary high-benefit leader and 28% of the time a voluntary low-
benefit leader. As indicated in the right panel of Figure 2, over time the instances of EN_LBL
decrease, while the instances of EN_HBL remains rather stable (Spearman’s ρ=-0.21, p < .01
for EN_LBL, and Spearman’s ρ  = -0.02, p = .74 for EN_HBL). Towards the end, EN_NL
becomes frequent. Indeed, high-benefit members, on average, volunteer to be the leader much
more often than low-benefit members (39.4% vs 22.7%, p = .01, two-sided Wilcoxon signed-
ranks test).14 A probit regression on subjects’ willingness to be the leader (as shown in Table
A2 in the appendix, with individual benefit type, cooperation preference and the time trend as
independent variables) confirms this result and reveals that individual cooperation preference
is another important determinant of the decision to lead: the more pro-social a subject is, the
more likely she is willing to be the first mover. Model (3) in Table A2 further shows that over
time, low-benefit members have a significantly decreasing willingness to become the leader.
Result 3: Subjects’ willingness to lead is influenced by their benefit type, their cooperation
preference and the time trend: (1) High-benefit members are more likely to volunteer than low-
benefit members; (2) the more pro-social a member is, the more likely she is willing to be the
leader; and (3) low-benefit members exhibit a decreasing motivation to become the leader.
3.2 Leader and follower behavior
The success of leadership relies on two factors: leaders setting good examples, and followers
responding to the leaders’ examples. Figure 3 illustrates the evolution of contribution of leaders
and their counterparts: the left panel shows high-benefit members and the right panel low-
benefit members.15 Contributions of high-benefit members decline significantly over time in
BASE (Spearman’s ρ = -0.49, p < .01). In contrast, high-benefit leaders’ contributions are fairly
13 Table A1 in the appendix reports the number of observations in each possible state of EN by period.
14 This result is confirmed by a chi-square test (p < .01). Figure A5 in the appendix shows the fraction of volunteers
over time for each player type. The difference in terms of the tendency to volunteer for leadership between the two
types of players already exists in the first period (50.0% vs. 33.3%, p = .07, two-sided Wilcoxon signed-ranks test).
15 Table A3 in the appendix displays average contributions of group members by type in each treatment.
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stable (Spearman’s ρ = -0.02, p = .81 in HBL; Spearman’s ρ = -0.04, p = .69 in EN_HBL).
Over all periods, high-benefit leaders contribute more than their counterparts in BASE, but the
difference is only significant in EN_HBL (p = .18 for HBL; p = .01 for EN_HBL). Leaders’
contributions are higher in EN_HBL than in HBL, but the difference is not significant (p = .51).
Figure 3: Average contributions of leaders and their corresponding counterparts
Note: High-benefit members in the left panel and low-benefit members in the right panel.
The right panel shows the comparison between low-benefit leaders and their counterpart
members. In BASE, low-benefit members contribute about half as much as high-benefit
members initially, and contributions decrease significantly over time (Spearman’s ρ = -0.39,
p < .01). In contrast, leaders in LBL start out at a medium contribution level that is only slightly
smaller than the initial leader contribution in HBL. However, contributions drop quickly to
about half of the number of high-benefit leaders. There is an overall decreasing trend in leaders’
contributions in LBL (Spearman’s ρ = -0.22, p = .02), while this is not the case in EN_LBL
with voluntary leaders (Spearman’s ρ = .07, p = .55). Over all ten periods, imposed low-benefit
leaders contribute significantly less than imposed high-benefit leaders (p < .01, N = 23),
whereas voluntary leaders contribute similar amounts, irrespective of their benefit type (p = .99,
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N = 21, two-sided Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests).16 Nonetheless, under both forms of low-
benefit leadership, leaders’ contributions are significantly higher than their counterparts in
BASE (p = .04 in LBL; p < .01 in EN_LBL). Still, leaders’ contributions are significantly larger
in EN_LBL than in LBL (p < .01).
Table 4 reports a random effects regression comparing contributions of leaders and their
corresponding counterparts. Models (1) to (3) compare between high-benefit leaders and their
high-benefit counterparts, while Models (4) to (6) compare between low-benefit leaders and
their low-benefit counterparts. The coefficients of treatment dummies in both Models (1) and
(4) are significantly positive, indicating that high-benefit leader and low-benefit leader
contributions are significantly higher than their corresponding counterparts in BASE,
regardless of the way how leadership is generated. The magnitude of the effect, however, is
largest for EN_LBL. We get qualitatively the same results when controlling for the time trend
and leaders’ cooperation preferences, as shown in Model (2) and (5), indicating that leadership
behavior cannot simply be attributed to time or self-selection effects.
In Models (3) and (6), we add the time trend and interaction terms between the time and
treatment dummies. Model (3) shows that high-benefit leaders’ contributions have a completely
different time trend than their counterparts. An F-test further confirms the stable trend of high-
benefit leaders’ contributions by failing to reject the null hypothesis that the combined effect of
Period and Period*HBL (or Period*EN_HBL) is equal to zero (p = .32 for HBL and p = .17 for
EN_HBL). The picture looks a bit different for low-benefit leaders. We only find a stable trend
of low-benefit leaders’ contributions in EN_LBL (p = .52 for the combined effect of Period and
Period*EN_LBL; p = .06 for the combined effect of Period and Period*LBL). In addition, the
significantly positive dummy EN_LBL in Model (6) indicates that relative to their counterparts,
voluntary low-benefit leaders shift their contributions upward from the beginning of the game,
which is also reflected in the right panel of Figure 3.
Result 4: Over all periods, leaders, in particular voluntary leaders, contribute significantly
16 For this analysis, we include only those groups that experienced both states of leadership. This result also holds
in regressions where we add the time trend and leaders’ cooperation preference as control variables (see Table A4 in
the appendix).
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more than their corresponding counterparts in treatment BASE.
Table 4: Random effects regression analysis of leaders’ contributions
Dependent variable:
Leaders’ contributions
High-benefit Low-benefit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HBL 3.118* 3.319** -0.857
(1.708) (1.623) (1.683)
EN_HBL 4.182*** 4.051*** 0.297
(1.155) (1.230) (1.570)
Period*HBL 0.762***
(0.221)
Period*EN_HBL 0.698***
(0.220)
Period -0.608*** -0.925*** -0.487*** -0.590***
(0.118) (0.147) (0.122) (0.164)
SVO 4.273*** 4.287*** -0.194 -0.179
(1.622) (1.614) (1.295) (1.312)
LBL 2.782** 3.222** 1.957
(1.410) (1.413) (2.059)
EN_LBL 10.071** 9.884*** 8.183***
(1.392) (1.345) (2.139)
Period*LBL 0.228
(0.255)
Period*EN_LBL 0.367
(0.383)
Constant 10.229** 12.427*** 14.168*** 4.162*** 6.515*** 7.080***
(0.762) (1.240) (1.287) (0.938) (1.222) (1.447)
R2 overall 0.09 0.15 0.18 0.24 0.30 0.31
N 461 449 449 427 410 410
Note: The reference category is high-benefit members in BASE in Models (1) to (3) and low-benefit members in BASE in Models
(4) to (6). The variables “HBL”, “LBL” “EN_HBL”, “EN_LBL” are dummy variables indicating leaders in those treatments/states.
“SVO” is the angle of the vector elicited in the social value orientation task: the larger this value is, the more pro-social the subject
is. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on group level). * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
Result 5: Imposed low-benefit leaders contribute about half as much as imposed high-benefit
leaders, while voluntary low-benefit leaders contribute similar amounts as voluntary high-
benefit leaders.
Does setting good examples pay off for leaders? For high-benefit leaders, their
contributions and profits are positively correlated (Spearman’s ρ = .8, p < .01 in HBL, N = 16; 
Spearman’s ρ = .62, p = .02 in EN_HBL, N = 14). In contrast, for low-benefit leaders, there is
no positive relationship between contributions and profits (Spearman’s ρ = -0.03, p = .92 in
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LBL, N = 16; Spearman’s ρ = -0.17, p = .61 in EN_LBL, N = 11). We also run random effects
regressions on leaders’ payoffs (with leaders’ contributions, the time trend and followers’
cooperation preference as independent variables, as shown in Table A5 in the appendix). The
results of these regressions confirm that setting good examples pays off for high-benefit leaders,
but is not beneficial for low-benefit leaders. As shown in Figure A7 in the appendix, under
voluntary low-benefit leadership, the leader earns only slightly above the initial endowment
and needs to bear the largest disadvantageous inequality in terms of earnings within the group.
These findings explain why we see a declining trend in leaders’ contributions in LBL and why
there is a declining willingness of low-benefit members to volunteer.
Result 6: Setting good examples is, on average, beneficial for high-benefit leaders, but not for
low-benefit leaders.
Figure 4: Average contributions by identity and type under high-benefit leadership
Note: “HL” represents high-benefit leaders. “HF”/“LF” represents high- and low-benefit followers respectively, while
“HB”/“LB” represents high- and low-benefit members in BASE.
In the remainder of this section, we turn to the behavior of followers. Figures 4 and 5
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present contribution dynamics of leaders and followers under high- and low-benefit leadership.
We add contribution dynamics of group members in the baseline treatment, as illustrated by the
two dashed lines. As shown in Figure 4 that considers only the situation of high-benefit
leadership, high-benefit followers undercut leaders’ contributions significantly (two-sided
Wilcoxon signed-ranks test: p = .04 in HBL and p = .01 in EN_HBL). Low-benefit followers
contribute about half of the amount of the leader in the first period and decrease contributions
over time. Their contributions are significantly lower than those of high-benefit leaders
(p < .005 in HBL and p < .0001 in EN_HBL). Using data from all periods, we do not observe
a significant difference in contributions between followers and their corresponding counterparts
in treatment BASE (p > .3).
Figure 5: Average contributions by identity and type under low-benefit leadership
Note: “LL” represents low-benefit leaders. “HF”/“LF” represents high- and low-benefit followers respectively, while
“HB”/“LB” represents high- and low-benefit members in BASE.
Figure 5 displays contributions under low-benefit leadership. Low-benefit followers also
contribute significantly less than leaders (two-sided Wilcoxon signed-ranks test: p < .005 in
LBL and p = .0001 in EN_LBL). For high-benefit followers, their contributions are marginally
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significantly higher than leaders in LBL (p = .06), and significantly lower than leaders in
EN_LBL (p = .02). Yet, there is no significant difference in contributions between followers
and their corresponding counterparts in treatment BASE (p > .3).
Table 5 presents a random effects regression of followers’ contributions on treatment/state
dummies. Models (1) and (2) compare high-benefit followers with their high-benefit
counterparts in treatment BASE; Models (3) and (4) compare low-benefit followers with their
low-benefit counterparts in BASE. All coefficients on treatment dummies are positive,
indicating a positive effect on followers’ contributions, but the only significant coefficient is
the one for low-benefit followers in EN_LBL.
Table 5: Random effects regression analysis of followers’ contributions
Dependent variables:
Followers’ contributions
(1)
HF
(2)
HF
(3)
LF
(4)
LF
HBL 1.303 1.442 1.824 2.124
(1.798) (1.744) (1.721) (1.597)
LBL 0.025 0.359 1.201 1.968
(1.568) (1.687) (1.409) (1.437)
EN_HBL 1.472 1.556 1.037 1.484
(1.328) (1.381) (1.200) (1.096)
EN_LBL 0.940 0.354 3.150** 3.266**
(1.106) (1.199) (1.600) (1.626)
Period -0.522*** -0.472***
(0.108) (0.072)
SVO 3.517** 2.751**
(1.401) (1.169)
Constant 10.229*** 12.187*** 4.162*** 5.642***
(0.760) (1.186) (0.936) (1.039)
R2 overall 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.12
N 835 801 869 850
Note: The reference category is high-benefit members in BASE in Models (1) and (2), and is
low-benefit members in BASE in Models (3) and (4). “HF”/“LF” represents high- and low-
benefit followers respectively. The variables “HBL”, “LBL” “EN_HBL”, “EN_LBL” are
dummy variables indicating followers in those treatments/states. “SVO” is the angle of the
vector elicited in the social value orientation task: the larger this value is, the more pro-social
the subject is. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on group level). * p < .1,
** p < .05, *** p < .01.
Taken together, leadership has little effect in promoting follower contributions. Only under
voluntary low-benefit leadership do we observe a significant increase in low-benefit followers’
22
contributions. Moreover, voluntary leadership does not seem to have more influence than
imposed leaders in our setting. In contrast, followers exploit voluntary leaders to a stronger
extent than imposed leaders. The distance between leaders’ and followers’ average
contributions is larger with voluntary leaders than with randomly assigned leaders (p = .11 for
HBL vs. EN_HBL; p < .001 for LBL vs. EN_LBL). The asymmetry in the group appears to
provide an excuse that leads to a reduction of a potentially positive leadership effect for both
exogenous and endogenous leadership, with an even more pronounced reduction for voluntary
leadership.
Result 7: Relative to their corresponding counterparts in treatment BASE, we only find a
significant increase in low-benefit followers’ contributions in EN_LBL. Followers exploit
leaders more strongly when leaders volunteer than when leadership is imposed.
Table 6 reports the results of a random effects regression on how followers respond to their
leaders’ contributions. Except for leaders’ contributions, we include the time trend, the follower
type, the interaction term between leaders’ contributions and the follower type, and individual
cooperation preference as independent variables. Table 6 indicates that, with high-benefit
leaders, it is mainly the high-benefit followers who reciprocate, irrespective of whether the
leader has been randomly assigned or volunteered. For every additional token the high-benefit
leader contributes in a given period, a low-benefit follower contributes, on average, about 0.15
tokens. The level of reciprocity of high-benefit followers is significantly higher, with an average
of about 0.6 tokens in HBL and 0.55 tokens in EN_HBL. Hence, high-benefit leaders’ examples
mainly have an impact on the same-type followers.
The last two columns of Table 6 show that low-benefit leaders have a significant influence
on low-benefit followers. For every additional token the low-benefit leader contributes in a
given period, low-benefit followers contribute 0.28 tokens in LBL and 0.35 tokens in EN_LBL.
The interaction term is positive in LBL but not significant, implying that reciprocity from high-
benefit followers is not significantly stronger than the one from low-benefit followers when
they face a low-benefit leader. It seems that for followers who are of a different type as the
leader, reciprocity towards the leader is based on a self-serving perception of contribution
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norms: with high-benefit leaders, low-benefit followers tend to balance their payoff with high-
benefit members, and thus reciprocate on a much lower level; with low-benefit leaders, high-
benefit followers try to balance the reciprocation level in contributions with low-benefit
members. We shall argue that the self-serving perception of contribution norms is one reason
for the inefficiency of leadership in the presence of benefit heterogeneity.
Table 6: Followers’ responses to leader’s example
Dependent variables:
Followers’ contributions
(1)
HBL
(2)
EN_HBL
(3)
LBL
(4)
EN_LBL
High-benefit follower -0.106 1.146 2.994 3.691*
(1.186) (1.621) (2.409) (2.074)
Leader’s contribution 0.156*** 0.143*** 0.282*** 0.352***
(0.059) (0.042) (0.106) (0.103)
High-benefit follower 0.452*** 0.391*** 0.219 -0.015
*Leader’s contribution (0.105) (0.117) (0.159) (0.149)
Period -0.422*** -0.461*** -0.138 -0.393*
(0.122) (0.077) (0.108) (0.230)
SVO 5.299*** 2.685* 3.600** 4.629***
(1.857) (1.631) (1.679) (1.621)
Constant 4.681*** 4.736*** 3.694*** 3.440**
(1.078) (0.837) (0.987) (1.493)
R2 overall 0.42 0.37 0.26 0.27
N 330 325 337 199
Note: “High-benefit follower” is a dummy variable which is 1 if the follower is of the high-
benefit type. “SVO” is the angle of the vector elicited in the social value orientation task:
the larger this value is, the more pro-social the subject is. Cluster robust standard errors in
parentheses (clustered on group level). * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
Result 8: High-benefit followers reciprocate more strongly than low-benefit followers under
high-benefit leadership. The two types of followers reciprocate at a similar level under low-
benefit leadership. We allegedly observe a self-serving perception of contribution norms.
3.3 Path dependency in HBL
Gächter & Renner (2018) report no significant difference in contributions between their
leadership treatment and a treatment without leadership, but they observe path dependency in
group contributions in both treatments: groups that start at high (low) cooperation levels
maintain high (low) cooperation in later periods. This finding, combined with the result that the
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initial leader contributions correlate positively with the initial group contributions, implies that
the initial leader’s contribution has a long-lasting effect on the group’s overall contribution in
the leadership treatment. Taking each group as the unit of independent observation, we find
significantly positive correlations between average group contributions in period 1 and average
group contributions from period 2 to 10 under high-benefit leadership, i.e., there is strong path
dependency in group contributions in HBL and EN_HBL (Spearman’s ρ = .78, p < .01 in HBL,
N = 11; Spearman’s ρ = .80, p <. 01 in EN_HBL, N = 11).17 The correlation, however, is not
significant with simultaneous contributions or in other leadership conditions. Since voluntary
high-benefit leadership does not necessarily start in period 1, in the following we mainly focus
on exogenous high-benefit leadership and explore the reasons for group heterogeneity in
performance in HBL.18
Does the effectiveness of repeated exogenous high-benefit leadership depend on the
contribution of the initial leader? In HBL, we classify all groups into two categories, based on
the median group contribution level, and denote them as successful groups and failed groups,
respectively. Figure 5 shows the contribution dynamics of leaders and followers in successful
and failed groups in HBL. Over all periods, leader contributions are significantly higher in
successful groups than in failed groups (p = .01). This distinction between the two categories
of groups already exists in the first period (p = .04, 7.8 vs. 17.8). Among the five failed groups,
four groups exhibit initial leader contributions that are at most 9 tokens. In contrast, all leaders
in the six successful groups contribute at least 10 tokens in the first period. Similar to Gächter
& Renner (2018), the initial leader contribution is positively correlated with initial followers’
contributions (Spearman’s ρ  = .57, p = .07) and the group contribution in the first period
(Spearman’s ρ  = .79, p < .01). Consequently, we find significantly higher followers’
contributions (p = .01, 6.1 vs. 12.6) and group contributions (p = .01, 6.5 vs. 13.9) in the first
17 The correlation in EN_HBL includes only those groups that experience high-benefit leadership in the first period.
As shown in Figure A4, not all groups in EN_HBL experience high-benefit leadership in the first period.
18  Recall that the variance in contributions across groups is largest in HBL. Figures A8 and A9 display the
contribution dynamics of leaders and each type of follower by group in HBL and LBL. In HBL, we observe a
significantly positive correlation between leader contributions in period 1 and leader contributions from period 2 to
10 (Spearman’s ρ = .73, p = .01, N = 11). It seems that in HBL some leaders underestimate the effect of their
cooperative examples, from the beginning.
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period in successful groups. All this suggests that in HBL, it is partly in the hand of the initial
leader to determine the group performance in the long run.
Figure 6: Successful and failed groups in HBL
Note: “SG”/“FG” represents successful groups/failed groups in HBL. “HL” represents high-benefit leader. “HF”/“LF”
represents high- and low-benefit followers respectively.
What determines the initial leader’s contribution? Gächter et al. (2012) find that both the
cooperative attitude and the belief towards others’ cooperativeness affect leader contributions.
In the initial period, given that there are not enough observations for regressions, we calculate
the Spearman rank correlation between leaders’ contributions and their beliefs/cooperation
preferences. We find that leaders’ initial contributions and their beliefs are strongly correlated
in the first period (Spearman’s ρ = .92, p = .0001 for the belief towards the same-type follower; 
Spearman’s ρ = .82, p = .002 for the belief towards different-type followers). The correlation
between leaders’ initial contributions and their cooperation preferences, however, are much
smaller both in terms of size and significance (Spearman’s ρ = .53, p = .09). Indeed, initial
leaders’ beliefs, in particular beliefs about their same-type followers’ cooperativeness, are
significantly higher in successful groups than in failed groups (11.3 vs. 6.5, p = .1 for average
belief towards all followers; 14.3 vs. 7.6, p = .06 for the belief towards the same-type follower; 
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9.83 vs. 6, p < .12 for beliefs towards different-type followers); while no significant difference 
in initial leaders’ cooperation preferences (0.28 vs. 0.21, p = .78) is detected between successful
and failed groups.
The influence of the imposed high-benefit leader’s period 1 contribution and beliefs on the
long-run group-level contributions is also confirmed in Table A6 in the appendix. In Model (1),
we control for the initial leader’s contribution, the initial followers’ cooperation preferences
and the time trend. We further add the initial leader’s cooperation preference to Model (2). The
results of the first two columns indicate that the initial leader’s contribution positively relates
to the whole group’s overall contributions. In Models (3) to (5), we replace the initial leader’s
contribution with the initial leader’s beliefs. The significant positive effect of beliefs in the last
three columns, in particular beliefs towards the same-type follower, confirms the previous
findings and suggests that increasing the initial high-benefit leader’s beliefs about others’
cooperation can be a potential way to raise contributions under normative conflict.
Result 9: In HBL, increasing the initial high-benefit leader’s beliefs about others’ cooperation
helps raising contributions under normative conflict.
4. Conclusion
In collective action problems in the wild, group members are likely to gain different benefits
from the provision of a public good. Our evidence suggests that, when there is benefit
heterogeneity in a group, the conflict between different equity and contribution norms is
difficult to overcome, even with a mechanism – leading by example – that has often been proven
as extremely useful in homogenous populations. This paper examined the effect of leading by
example on cooperation when individuals have different benefits from the group account by
using a linear public goods experiment.
We find that, under benefit heterogeneity, the effect of leading by example is limited in
promoting cooperation. Average contributions do not differ significantly between situations
with and without either type of randomly selected leadership. We only find a marginal increase
in contributions when the two types of randomly selected leadership – high-benefit leadership
and low-benefit leadership – are pooled, and we do not want to over-interpret this marginal
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result. With voluntary leaders, in particular voluntary low-benefit leaders, contributions are
significantly higher than those in the simultaneous contribution mechanism. However, the
motivation for low-benefit members to become voluntary leaders is decreasing quickly over
time. This trend, combined with the fact that contributions are lowest in case nobody in the
group volunteers to become the leader, raises contributions only marginally in the endogenous
treatment relative to our baseline treatment with simultaneous contributions. Nonetheless, in
our exogenous high-benefit leadership setting, there is strong path dependency in group
contributions, and contributions by followers can be promoted significantly when initial leaders
are optimistic. Since high-benefit leaders mainly influence high-benefit followers, selecting
optimistic high-benefit members as initial leaders might be more effective when there are
enough high-benefit members in the group. Future research could look at groups that consist of
three high-benefit members and one low-benefit member and vice versa.
We argue that the limited success of leadership in our setting is mainly attributed to two
aspects: leader contributions are not high enough and followers do not reciprocate enough, on
average. Leaders do not seem to believe that their good example can elevate the group outcome,
and if they do so, many seem to be disappointed quickly with the followers’ responses, leading
to a rapid decay in contributions and/or the willingness to become leader. Followers appear to
condition the level of reciprocity on the leader type. Specifically, low-benefit followers
reciprocate to the high-benefit leader, but the level of their reciprocity is particularly low. High-
benefit followers reciprocate to low-benefit leaders in a similar way as low-benefit followers,
which is not enough to promote cooperation. In addition, followers under voluntary leadership
strongly exploit leaders, in particular low-benefit leaders.19
Via a laboratory experiment, our study provides evidence on the limited effect of leading
by example in promoting cooperation in populations with benefit heterogeneity. It also poses
some questions for future research: How can groups with heterogeneity overcome the
coordination problem regarding different contribution norms, when there is a leader? Perhaps,
in such a situation the leader needs more than just the good example. For instance, it would be
19 Table A7 shows the relative frequency of chosen contribution norms for all conditions and further confirms our
conclusion.
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interesting to study situations with benefit heterogeneity in which leaders have additional
coercive power such as a punishment option or ostracism power. An alternative would be
introducing a communication option for leaders in order to alleviate the coordination problem.
Another promising route of research in view of our results is appropriate selection mechanisms
for leaders. It seems that type and nature of leaders matter when it comes to the effectiveness
of leadership. Relevant characteristics could be considered in appointment or selection (voting)
procedures.
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Online Appendix
Table A1: The number of independent observations for states in EN by period
Period EN_NL    EN_LBL EN_HBL Total
1 3 10 11 24
2 6 9 9 24
3 5 7 12 24
4 3 9 12 24
5 3 8 13 24
6 6 7 11 24
7 6 7 11 24
8 5 5 14 24
9 12 2 10 24
10 13 3 8 24
Total 62 67 111 240
Table A2: Determinants of the decision to lead in EN (Probit)
Dependent variable:
Choose to lead (=1 if yes)
(1)
All subjects
(2)
 High-benefit
(3)
Low-benefit
High-benefit type 0.489***
(=1 if yes) (0.164)
SVO 0.773*** 0.825*** 0.782***
(0.217) (0.296) (0.265)
Period -0.051** -0.030 -0.076**
(0.024) (0.032) (0.033)
Constant -0.649*** -0.284 -0.526***
(0.161) (0.173) (0.179)
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.03 0.06
N 940 470 480
Note: “High-benefit type” is a dummy which is 1 if the subject is of high-benefit type. “SVO” is the angle of the vector
elicited in the social value orientation task: the larger this value is, the more pro-social the subject is. Cluster robust
standard errors in parentheses (clustered on group level). * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
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Table A3: Average contributions by identity and player type
HB LB
BASE 10.23 (2.72) 4.16 (3.35)
EN_NL 6.33 (5.04) 2.89 (2.67)
HL HF LF
HBL 13.2 (5.36) 11.5 (5.62) 5.99 (4.97)
EN_HBL 14.41 (4.14) 11.71 (5.95) 5.18 (3.70)
HF LL LF
LBL 10.25 (4.91) 7.06 (4.01)      5.27 (3.76)
EN_LBL 11.64 (3.80) 14.52 (4.77)      6.90 (5.64)
Note: “HB(LB)” refers to high-benefit (low-benefit) members. “HL(HF)” refers to high-benefit leaders (high-
benefit followers). “LL(LF)” refers to low-benefit leaders (low-benefit followers). Standard deviations in
parentheses.
Table A4: Leader’s contribution across leadership treatments and states
Dependent variable: Leader’s contribution
Voluntary leader 6.606***
(1.593)
High-benefit leader 6.090***
(1.863)
Voluntary leader*High-benefit leader -5.855***
(2.238)
Period -0.249**
(0.100)
SVO 2.961**
(1.295)
Constant 7.993***
(1.132)
R2 overall 0.23
N 399
Note: “Voluntary leader” is a dummy variable which is 1 if the leader is
voluntary; “High-benefit leader” is a dummy variable which is 1 if the
leader is of high-benefit type; “SVO” is the angle of the vector elicited
in the social value orientation task: the larger this value is, the more pro-
social the subject is. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
(clustered on group level). * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
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Table A5：Determinants of leader’s payoff
Dependent variable:
Leader’s payoff
(1)
HBL
(2)
EN_HBL
(3)
LBL
(4)
EN_LBL
Leader’s contribution 0.508*** 0.474*** -0.080* -0.119
(0.174) (0.124) (0.048) (0.076)
Period -1.011*** -1.200*** -0.220 -0.440*
(0.310) (0.196) (0.144) (0.266)
SVO of the same-type follower 7.860 7.515* -1.163 1.718
(5.444) (3.918) (1.898) (2.052)
Average SVO of different-type followers 20.145* 0.954 3.019 10.146***
(12.171) (4.922) (7.255) (2.814)
Constant 27.355*** 32.094*** 27.522*** 24.402***
(4.107) (1.947) (2.264) (1.650)
R2 overall 0.42 0.29 0.03 0.34
N 110 109 113 67
Note: “SVO” is the angle of the vector elicited in the social value orientation task: the larger this value, the more pro-
social the subject is. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (on group level). * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
Table A6: Determinants of group contributions in HBL
Dependent variable: Group contribution (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Initial leader’s contribution 0.268** 0.336***
(0.112) (0.074)
SVO of initial h-follower 6.248*** 6.551*** 6.820*** 6.415*** 6.981***
(1.888) (1.559) (1.656) (1.334) (1.790)
Average SVO of initial l-followers 12.857*** 15.608*** 20.139*** 19.821*** 20.303***
(4.698) (5.119) (5.675) (5.232) (5.936)
Period -0.375*** -0.375*** -0.375*** -0.375*** -0.375***
(0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135)
SVO of initial leader -4.175* -5.353** -6.195** -4.558*
(2.536) (2.678) (2.877) (2.553)
Initial leader’s belief about all followers 0.327**
(0.142)
Initial leader’s belief about h-follower 0.343***
(0.106)
Initial leader’s belief about l-followers 0.282*
(0.164)
Constant 2.650 1.911 2.272 1.783 2.710
(1.924) (2.020) (2.228) (1.962) (2.313)
R2 overall 0.57 0.62 0.55 0.57 0.54
N 110 110 110 110 110
Note: “h-/l-follower(s)” refers to high-/low-benefit follower(s) respectively. “SVO” is the angle of the vector elicited in the social
value orientation task: the larger this value is, the more prosocial the subject is. “Initial leader’s belief about all/l- followers” is the
initial leader’s belief about all/low-followers’ average contribution. “Initial leader’s belief about h-follower” is the initial leader’s
belief about the high-benefit follower’s contribution. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on group level). * p
< .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. We obtain similar results when using followers’ average contribution as the dependent variable.
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Table A7: Distribution of contribution norms for different treatments and states
BASE HBL LBL EN EN_NL EN_HBL EN_LBL
(a) Equality of contributions 33.33% 18.18% 50.00% 37.5% 28.57% 16.67% 71.43%
(b) Equality of earnings - - - - - 4.17% -
(c) Proportional to benefits 8.33% 45.45% 16.67% 25.00% 28.57% 37.50% 14.29%
(d) Between (b) and (c) 33.33% 27.27% 33.33% 29.17% 19.05% 25.00% 9.52%
(e) Others 25% 9.09% - 8.33% 23.81% 16.67% 4.76%
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Figure A1: Group contribution dynamics in treatment BASE
Figure A2: Group contribution dynamics in HBL
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Figure A3: Group contribution dynamics in LBL
Figure A4: Group contribution dynamics in EN
Note: “H”/“L”/“N” represents the state in effect - high-/ low-/no-leadership - in the endogenous treatment.
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Figure A5: The fraction of volunteers over time by player type
Note: “HB”/”LB” represents high- and low-benefit members.
Figure A6: Group contribution dynamics in BASE by player type
Note: “HB”/“LB” represents high- and low-benefit members respectively.
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Figure A7: Payoff dynamics of leaders and followers in leadership conditions
Note: “HF”/“LF” represents high- and low-benefit followers respectively.
Figure A8: Group contribution dynamics in HBL by player identity and type
Note: “HL” represents high-benefit leaders. “HF”/“LF” represents high- and low-benefit followers respectively.
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Figure A9: Group contribution dynamics in LBL by player identity and type
Note: “LL” represents low-benefit leaders. “HF”/“LF” represents high- and low-benefit followers respectively.
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Experimental instructions
Welcome to this experiment! Thank you very much for participating!
Please do not talk to other participants from now on!
General
This is an experiment on decision making. You receive €4.00 for showing up on time. If you read these
instructions carefully, you can make good decisions and earn a considerable amount of money that will
be paid out to you in cash at the end of the experiment.
The experiment will last approximately 1 hour. If you have any questions, please raise your hand, and an
experimenter will come to you and answer your questions privately. During the experiment, your
earnings will be calculated in experimental points. At the end of the experiment, all points that you earn
will be converted into Euro at the exchange rate announced at the beginning of each part.
In the interest of clarity, we will only use male terms in the experiment. They should be interpreted as
being gender-neutral.
Anonymity
You will learn neither during nor after the experiment, with whom you interact(ed) in the experiment.
The other participants will neither during nor after the experiment learn, how much you earn(ed). We
never link names and data from experiments. At the end of the experiment you will be asked to sign a
receipt regarding your earnings which serves only as a proof for our sponsor. The latter does not receive
any other data from the experiment.
Means of help
You will find a pen at your table which we kindly ask that you, please, leave on the table when the
experiment is over. While you make your decisions, a clock at the top of your computer screen will run
down. This clock will inform you regarding how long we think that the maximum decision time will be.
However, if you need more time, you may exceed the limit. The input screens will not be dismissed once
time runs out. However, the output/information screens (here you do not have to make any decisions)
will be dismissed after time is up.
Experiment
The experiment consists of two parts. You will receive instructions for the second part after the first part
has ended. These instructions will be read to you aloud. Then you will have an opportunity to study them
on your own and to ask questions privately.
Your total earnings in this experiment will be the sum of your earnings in parts 1 and 2. The two parts of
the experiment are completely independent, i.e. decisions in part 1 have no consequences for your
earnings in part 2.
Part 1
Exchange rate
Any point earned in Part 1 will be converted into Euro at the following exchange rate:
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1 Point=0.02 Euro (50 Points = 1 Euro).
The basic decision situation
This part consists of 10 identical periods. You are randomly assigned into a group of four at the
beginning of this part. The group composition does not change over the 10 periods. That means your
group consists of the same people in all 10 periods. Before the first period starts, two group members are
randomly selected to be of type A and the remaining two members will be of type B. The meanings of
type A and type B will be explained below. You will be informed of your type at the beginning of the
first period and your type remains unchanged during this entire part. Additionally, each group member
receives a random identification number (ID) from 1 to 4. This number will remain fixed during this
entire part.
In every period, each group member has to decide on the allocation of 20 points. You can keep these 20
points in your private account or you can contribute them fully or partially to a group account. Each
point you do not contribute to the group account will automatically remain in your private account.
Saving points for a later period is therefore not possible.
Your income from the private account:
You will earn one point for each point you keep in your private account. For example, if you keep 20
points in your private account (and therefore do not contribute anything to the group account) your
income will amount to exactly 20 points out of your private account. If you keep 6 points in your private
account (and therefore contribute 14 points to the group account), your income from this account will be
6 points. No one except you earns something from your private account.
Individual income from your private account =
20 – Your contribution to the group account
Your income from the group account:
Each group member will profit from the amount you contribute to the group account. On the other hand,
you will also get a payoff from the other group members’ contributions to the group account. The
individual income for each group member out of the group account will be determined as follows:
Individual income from the group account =
Sum of all group members’ contributions to the group account ´ type-factor
If you are of type A, your type-factor is 0.4. If you are of type B, your type-factor is 0.8. That is, for each
point contributed by all group members to the group account, you receive 0.4 points if you are of type A
and you receive 0.8 points if you are of type B.
Total income:
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Your total income is the sum of your income from your private account and that from the group account:
Income from your private account (= 20 – Contribution to the group account)
+ Income from the group account (= Sum of contributions to the group account´ type-factor)
= Your total income
Example: Suppose you contribute 8 points to the group account and the other three members contribute
20 points to the group account altogether. Then your income from the private account will be 12 points
(20-8=12). Your income from the group account will be 11.2 points (0.4× (20+8) =11.2) if you are of
type A and 22.4 points (0.8× (20+8) =22.4) if you are of type B. Hence, your total income will be
12+11.2=23.2 points if you are of type A and 12+22.4=34.4 points if you are of type B.
How you interact with your group members
At the beginning of each period, the computer will randomly assign the role of “First mover” to one of
the two members of type B [LBL: type A] in your group. The three remaining members in the group
will be assigned the role of “Second mover”.
Each period consists of the following two stages:
1. First mover decides about his own contribution to the group account before the other second movers.
2. Being informed about the ID and contribution decision of the first mover, the other three second
movers decide simultaneously and privately about their own contributions. This means no second mover
will be informed about the contribution decision of another second mover before he makes his decision.
Which member of type B [LBL: type A] goes first is determined randomly for each period.
[EN: At the beginning of each period, you decide if you want to be the first mover or a second mover.
Being the first mover means that you will make your contribution decision before the other group
members. Being a second mover means that before you make your contribution decision, you will be
told the type, ID and contribution decision of the first mover in your group. The three second movers
make contribution decisions simultaneously and privately. This means no second mover will be informed
about the contribution decision of another second mover before he makes his decision.
Only one member can be the first mover in a group eventually. So in case of ties, one member will be
randomly selected (with equal probability) to be the first mover. Only the one or those who are involved
in the random draw but are not selected will be informed about the existence of the random draw. If no
member chooses to be the first mover, all the four group members will contribute simultaneously and
privately. This means nobody will be informed about the contribution decision of another group member
before he makes his decision.]
[BASE: All group members make contribution decisions simultaneously and privately. This means
nobody will be informed about the contribution decision of another group member before he makes his
44
decision.]
Procedure of Part 1
At the beginning of this part you will be informed about your type and ID. After checking them, please
click “Continue”. Then a screen will show you whether you are the first mover or a second mover.
Please click “Continue” to proceed.
· If you are the first mover, you have to decide how many of the 20 points you contribute to the
group account before the other three group members. The other three group members are second
movers and would make their contribution decisions simultaneously and privately after seeing
your type, ID and contribution. Please insert your contribution in the box on your screen. You can
insert integers only (e.g., numbers like 0, 1, 2…20). The difference between 20 and your
contribution to the group account is automatically the amount you keep in your private account.
After you have chosen your contribution, please click “OK”. You cannot change your decision after
you have pressed “OK”. After clicking “OK”, a waiting screen will appear. The experiment
continues after all second movers have made their decisions.
· If you are a second mover, you will be asked to wait patiently. After the first mover has made his
decision, a screen will show you his type, ID, and contribution to the group account. In the lower
part of that screen, you have to decide how many of the 20 points you contribute to the group
account. You can insert integers only (e.g., numbers like 0, 1, 2…20). The difference between 20
and your contribution to the group account is automatically the amount you keep in your private
account. Please click “OK” if you are ready to continue. A waiting screen will appear until all second
movers have pressed “OK”.
[EN: At the beginning of this part you will be informed about your type and ID. After checking them,
please click “Continue”. Then you will be asked to indicate your moving position (whether you want
to be the first mover or a second mover in the current period). After choosing your moving order,
please click “OK” to proceed. Then a screen will show you whether you are the first mover or a second
mover, or tell you nobody in your group chooses to be the first mover. Please click “Continue” to
proceed.
· If you are the first mover, you have to decide how many of the 20 points you contribute to the
group account before the other three group members. The other three group members are second
movers and would make their contribution decisions simultaneously and privately after seeing
your type, ID and contribution. Please insert your contribution in the box on your screen. You can
insert integers only (e.g., numbers like 0, 1, 2…20). The difference between 20 and your
contribution to the group account is automatically the amount you keep in your private account.
After you have chosen your contribution, please click “OK”. You cannot change your decision after
you have pressed “OK”.
· If you are a second mover, you will be asked to wait patiently. After the first mover has made his
decision, a screen will show you his type, ID, and contribution to the group account. In the lower
part of that screen, you have to decide how many of the 20 points you contribute to the group
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account. You can insert integers only (e.g., numbers like 0, 1, 2…20). The difference between 20
and your contribution to the group account is automatically the amount you keep in your private
account. Please click “OK” if you are ready to continue.
· If nobody in your group chooses to be the first mover, you have to decide how many of the 20
points you contribute to the group account. The only difference from the two cases above is that
you make the decision with the other three group members simultaneously and privately. You can
insert integers only (e.g., numbers like 0, 1, 2…20). The difference between 20 and your
contribution to the group account is automatically the amount you keep in your private account.
Please click “OK” if you are ready to continue. ]
[BASE: At the beginning of this part you will be informed about your type and ID. After checking them,
please click “Continue”. Then you have to decide how many of the 20 points you contribute to the
group account. Please insert your contribution in the box on your screen. You can insert integers only
(e.g., numbers like 0, 1, 2…20). The difference between 20 and your contribution to the group account
is automatically the amount you keep in your private account. After you have chosen your contribution,
please click “OK”. You cannot change your decision after you have pressed “OK”.]
At the end of the period, every group member will receive an information screen regarding the type, ID,
moving position (First mover or not) and contribution of each group member, as well as every member’s
income from that period. After receiving feedback, the next period starts. After 10 periods, Part 1 of the
experiment ends.
[BASE: At the end of the period, every group member will receive an information screen regarding the
type, ID, and contribution of each group member, as well as every member’s income from that period.
After receiving feedback, the next period starts. After 10 periods, Part 1 of the experiment ends.]
Your earnings from Part 1 will be the sum of your total income from the 10 periods, and it will be paid
out in cash to you at the end of the experiment. After the end of Part 1 you will get instructions for Part
2.
Before we proceed, please try to solve the control questions on your screen. If you want to compute
something, you can use the Windows calculator by clicking on the calculation symbol on your screen.
Part 2
You are randomly assigned into a group of two at the beginning of this part. You have to answer 24
questions, in which you can choose one of two options A or B. Every option results in a positive or
negative payoff for you and the other person in your group. The other person answers exactly the same
questions. Your payoff in part 2 depends on your decision and the decision of the other person in your
group.
A decision example:
Option A Option B
Your payoff 10.00 7.00
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Other’s payoff -5.00 4.00
· If you choose option A, you receive 10 points, and the other person loses 5 points. If the other person
also chooses option A, he, too, receives 10 points and you lose 5 points. In total, you therefore earn
5 points (10 points from your choice minus 5 points from the other person’s choice). The other
person earns 5 points (10 points – 5 points), too.
· If you choose option B and the other person chooses option A, you earn 2 points (7 points from
your own choice minus 5 points from the other person’s choice). The other person would earn 14
points (10 points + 4 points).
· The remaining combinations (you choose A and the other person chooses B, or you both choose B)
are analogous to these two examples.
Overall you take 24 decisions like the one described above. Your total payoff is computed as follows:
The 24 values for “your payoff” are summed up over your decisions. The 24 values for “Other’s payoff”
are summed up over the other person’s decisions. The sum of these two sums determines your total payoff
from this part and is converted into Euro at the following exchange rate:
1 Point=0.10 Euro (10 Points = 1 Euro).
Note that you are not receiving information on each single decision taken by the other person in your
group. Rather, you will find out only the sum of your decisions for “your payoff”, the sum of the other
person’s decisions for “Other’s payoff” and your total payoff from Part 2.
If there are any questions, please raise your hand now. We will come to you and answer your questions
privately.
After Part 2, you will be asked to complete two short questionnaires. This will conclude the experiment.
You will receive information on your respective income for Parts 1 and 2, and we will pay you your
earnings in private.
